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To explain the empirical fact that different individuals have different individual welfare functions, 
a  theory of preference formation has been developed by the first author. The theory essentially 
states that an individual's welfare function is identical to the distribution of consumption patterns 
the individual has observed over time. This includes both his own consumption and the consump- 
tion by others in his social reference group. The paper reviews the evidence collected with respect 
to directly measured individual welfare functions in Europe. Evidence obtained in related research 
by economists, psychologists, and sociologists is also discussed. 
1. Introduction 
The  Preference Formation (PF)  theory  to be discussed  in  this paper is 
presumably  as obvious to sociologists  and psychologists  as it is alien to 
economists. Still, to say that it is obvious is not to say it is trivial;  to say 
it is alien to economists is not to say it is irrelevant to economics. These 
observations  provide  the two main  themes  of this  paper.  First,  stating 
the theory with a reasonable degree of exactness brings out implications 
that  seem  to  have  gone  unnoticed  hitherto.  Secondly,  economists' 
almost  universal  neglect  of  preference  formation  has  led  them  to 
construct theories that are in certain respects altogether  unrealistic. 
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The  authors  are  economists.  Consequently,  the  discussion  will  be 
geared towards economic modelling and economic policy. We will not 
resist  the temptation, however, to  quote examples from related disci- 
plines that were brought to our attention. 
In section 2  we will explain the PF  theory in  an informal way but 
yet, hopefully, in sufficient detail to convey the basic notions. In section 
3  we  quote  some evidence from psychology and  sociology. Section 4 
summarizes quantitative evidence obtained in a  more systematic fash- 
ion within the Leyden Income Evaluation~project. To illustrate how a 
quantitative theory yields sharper policy conclusions than a  qualitative 
one,  some  exercises  with  the  theory  are  sketched  in  section  5.  To 
motivate why economists should be interested in this kind of theory, a 
discussion  of  its  relevance  to  certain  parts  of  economics  follows  in 
section  6.  Section  7  concludes  the  paper  with  an  appraisal  of  the 
empirical status of the PF theory and its promises. 
2. The theory 
"Happiness"  is  not  a  very  well-defined  concept.  In  practice  it  is 
generally defined in an operational way,  e.g. by asking people to rate 
their  own  happiness  and  by  taking  the  response  as  a  measure  of 
happiness (cf. Bradburn  1967:  Ch.  3).  We shall use the terms "happi- 
ness"  and  "well-being" interchangeably. The original meaning of the 
word "utility"  was probably quite close to  the concepts of happiness 
and  well-being.  Over  the  years  the  meaning  has  been  diluted  and 
nowadays  economists  merely  consider  utility as  an  index  (cf.,  e.g., 
Phlips (1974),  Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)).  Utility has become an 
ordinal concept, indicating that a  number representing the utility of a 
certain commodity bundle is more or less arbitrary,  the only condition 
being that if the utility of commodity bundle A is given by the number 
n A and the utility of commodity bundle B  is given by the number nB, 
then r/A >  n B if and only if A  is preferred to B. 
The assumed ordinal nature of utility is not based on any empirical 
evidence  implying  that  individuals  are  not  able  to  rate  commodity 
bundles on an interval scale. Ordinality has been assumed because the 
economic  theory  of  choice  does  not  require  anything  stronger  than 
ordinal utility. Consequently, economists have invoked Occam's razor 
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reasonable to suppose that if an individual prefers commodity bundle A 
to commodity bundle B he will actually be happier when he consumes 
A  than  when  he  would  consume  B.  Since  there  is  no  compelling 
empirical  evidence  against  cardinal  utility  and  because  economists 
discover an increasing number of choice situations where only a  cardi- 
nal utility concept can describe choices (the most famous one having to 
do with decisions under uncertainty, cf.  Von Neumann and Morgen- 
stern  (1944))  we  feel  free  to  consider utility,  well-being, welfare  and 
happiness as rough equivalents. That is, empirical evidence concerning 
one of these concepts is taken to have a bearing on the other concepts 
as well. 
In this paper we discuss empirical evidence regarding the determi- 
nants of utility. Since, as said, a  utility function is a  representation of 
one's preferences,  this  is  equivalent  to  saying that  we  are  concerned 
with  empirical  evidence on  preference formation.  In  tiffs  section  the 
theory is  introduced by means of some suggestive examples. A  more 
formal statement has been given in Kapteyn (1977). 
In a  well-known paper, Easterlin (1974)  reports on a  cross-country 
comparison of self-ratings of happiness.  It  turns  out  that  there is  no 
significant correlation between the average rating per country and its 
per capita national income. Within each country, however, the self-rat- 
ings  increase  with  the  respondents'  incomes.  The  result  has  been 
explained,  by  Easterlin  himself and  by  others,  by  hypothesizing that 
happiness doesn't have so much to do with one's absolute income level 
as  with  the ratio  between one's income level and  the average income 
level in one's reference group. 
In slightly more formal terminology: 
f  Y"  (1)  Un~-  N 
k--1 
where U  n is  the self-rating of happiness ("well-being") of Individual n 
(n =  1  .... , N;  i.e.  there are N  individuals in society), y, is the income 
level  of  Individual  n  and  w,k  is  the  reference  weight  assigned  by 
Individual n  to Individual k.  The reference weights are normalized to 
sum to unity; ~U~=~ w~---- 1,  for each n.  The function f  is presumably 
non-decreasing.  This  formulation  was  suggested  by  Easterlin  (1974: 140  A. Kapteyn,  T.  Wansbeek  /  Preference formation 
112),  except that we have replaced total consumption C~ by after  tax 
income yk.  Easterlin's  formulation is  a  specialization  of  the  original 
suggestion by Duesenberry (1949:  35). 
Obviously,  happiness  is  a  function  of  more  variables  than  just 
income (like health, leisure, family relations, equity evaluations, expec- 
tations,  work conditions).  We  could represent  those by  adding  argu- 
ments to f.  For simplicity these complications are mostly ignored. But 
at the end of this section we will briefly discuss the possible impact of 
this neglect. 
Of course, the hypothesis gives a beautiful explanation of Easterlin's 
findings,  although  it  is  not  the  only  possible  explanation  (see,  e.g., 
Easterlin  (1974),  Abramowitz  (1979),  Hirsch  (1977)).  For  reasons  of 
space we will not discuss the alternative explanations (for one thing, the 
alternative  explanations  are  not  capable  of  explaining  certain  other 
empirical facts presented below). Rather we want to take the basic idea 
for granted and elaborate upon it. 
First,  what  is  the  functional  form  of f?  Is f  the  same  for  each 
individual? Notice, incidentally, that for the ordinalists among us these 
questions do not make much sense. To them, (1)  only says  that more 
(relative)  income is preferred to less.  If it were true that (1)  has only 
ordinal significance, however, then Easterlin's  exercise could not have 
been carried out. There simply would be no such thing as a  numerical 
self-rating of happiness. The mere possibility of Easterlin's study there- 
fore strongly supports a cardinal viewpoint. 
Secondly, (1)  refers to a  particular period of time. Would it not be 
reasonable to assume that one's utility does not only depend on today's 
income relative to the mean income in today's reference group, but also 
on yesterday's mean reference group income, say? Note,  incidentally, 
that  w~n  is  one  of  the N  reference weights,  so  that  the  influence of 
Individual n's own income (both today's and yesterday's) is automati- 
cally accounted for. 
Thirdly, societies happen to consist of families rather than individu- 
als. One would think that in the computation of the denominator in (1), 
each  income Yk  should  somehow be  deflated by  the  size  of  the  k th 
family sharing the income. 
The three questions posed here indicate on the one hand that (1) may 
be a  little too simple to capture the determinants of individual utility, 
whereas on the other hand we would like to be more specific as to the 
form of the  function f.  Below we  describe  a  theory which addresses 
these points. A. Kapteyn,  T.  Wansbeek  /  Preference formation  141 
First consider the function f. To fix ideas, let us take an individual 
whose income is  twice the mean income of his  reference group. Now 
imagine two situations. In the first situation everyone in his reference 
group  has  roughly the same income, so  that his income ranks  at  the 
very  top  of  the  income  distribution  of  his  reference grou  p .  In  the 
second situation we assume that there is a wide disperson of incomes in 
his  reference group.  Now his  income is  in  the 70th  percentile of the 
income distribution of the reference group.  Comparing the two situa- 
tions, would we predict the same reported satisfaction with income in 
both  cases?  The  answer has  to  be  negative,  we  believe.  In  the  first 
situation the individual will give higher marks to his income than in the 
second situation. As a consequence, we have to conclude that f  depends 
on the shape of the income distribution in one's reference group. Since, 
in  principle,  different individuals  have  different  reference groups,  f 
should differ between individuals. A  very simple way to accommodate 
this  requirement is  to  assume  that  an  individual's  evaluation  of  his 
income depends on the ranking of the income in the income distribu- 
tion in the reference group. 
Now  the element of time.  If the individual's evaluation of income 
depends on the ranking of his income in today's income distribution in 
his reference group, but also on how today's income compares to past 
income distributions in his reference group, then we need to combine 
the income distributions in different periods. Intuitively, it would seem 
that the income distributions at different times will get different weights, 
presumably  the  weight  given  to  recent  income  distributions  being 
higher than those given to income distributions in a more remote past. 
Let us call these weights memory weights,  denoted as ant. So ani iS  the 
weight given by Individual n  to  the incomes in  period t,  where t =  0 
denotes the present. The memory weights can be used to combine the 
income distributions in different periods into Individual n's presently 
perceived  income  distribution,  which  is  nothing  else  than  a  memory 
weighted average of these income distributions. The word "perceived" 
is added to indicate the subjective nature of the concept, since both the 
memory Weights  and  the  reference weights  (defining  the  reference 
group)  are  subjective quantities  which cause  the  presently perceived 
income distributions to be different for different individuals. An obvi- 
ous  generalization of the earlier idea that  an  income is  evaluated by 
considering  its  ranking  in  the  income  distribution  of  the  reference 
group  is  now  to  hypothesize that  it  is  the  ranking  in  the  presently 142  A. Kapteyn, T.  Wansbeek /  Preference formation 
perceived income distribution which influences Individual n's  evalua- 
tion of a given income level. 
Finally, let us  take up  the problem of correcting for  differences in 
family  size.  It  is  not  income  itself  which  provides  utility,  it  is  the 
consumption possibilities associated with it. Thus, if a  family in  Indi- 
vidual n's  reference group  has  a  high  income but  also  many family 
members, then the consumption possibilities of those members may still 
be fairly limited. The consumption possibilities of each family member 
are  represented by  the (after  tax  family)  income per  equivalent adult 
("normalized  income",  for  short).  Thus  it  seems  that  it  is  not  the 
presently perceived distribution of family incomes that matters, but the 
presently  perceived  distribution  of  normalized  incomes.  When  the 
individual evaluates the income of his  own family with regard  to  the 
consumption possibilities it represents, he will again take into account 
the number of equivalent adults sharing the income [1]. 
As  a  consequence, he evaluates his family income by standardizing 
first and then considering its ranking in the presently perceived distri- 
bution of standardized incomes. This does not completely answer the 
question how f  in  (1)  has  to  be  specified,  because we  have  not  said 
anything yet about the form of the utility function. In Kapteyn (1977), 
it has been stated  that one's satisfaction with income, measured on  a 
[0,1]-scale (i.e. 0 =  no satisfaction,  1 =  complete satisfaction) is equal to 
the rank  order of the normalized income in  the perceived normalized 
distribution. This follows from his Preference Formation (PF) theory. It 
implies that  the utility function on  the left hand  side must have  the 
mathematical form of a probability distribution function. 
There are two arguments for this choice. First, Van Praag's individ- 
ual welfare function of income (WFI) (1968,  1971)  is a utility function 
with mathematical properties identical to those of a  probability distri- 
bution  function.  In  view  of  the  simple way  in  which WFI's  can  be 
measured, this formulation of the PF  theory lends itself for extensive 
testing, as we shall see. The second argument is of a more fundamental 
nature.  In economics, utility functions are  somewhat mysterious con- 
cepts.  They  describe  people's  preferences,  but  the  origin  of  these 
[1]  One may argue that the family size decision is not entirely exogenous, i.e. that children are a 
consumption good. However, the difference in length of horizon between family size decisions and 
other consumption decisions is sufficiently large to take family size as exogenous in the evaluation 
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preferences is unclear. One may argue, however (Kapteyn (1979)),  that 
utility functions can only exist after a frame of reference has developed. 
In the present context, the frame of reference is the perceived standar- 
dized income distribution. From considerations of scientific parsimony, 
as well as introspection, it  seems most reasonable to  assume that  the 
frame of reference is  used directly,  rather than first transformed into 
something else.  In any case, empirical evidence should help to decide 
the issue. This will be taken up in section 4. 
The preceding discussion was cast in terms of incomes. There is no 
barrier to extend the basic ideas to, for instance, consumption vectors 
(this was done in Kapteyn (1977)).  Neither is there any obvious reason 
to limit the applicability of the theory to economics, as we will see in 
the next section. 
We  started  the  discussion  of  Easterlin's  findings  by  saying  that 
'other' factors influencing welfare would be ignored. We did this in the 
belief that the theory described here at least captures one of the main 
mechanisms explaining  utility  functions.  The  following  sections  will 
indicate to which extent this is true. In evaluating empirical evidence it 
has  to be assumed that the left out factors do not systematically bias 
the evidence in favor of the theory. Generally, one would expect left out 
factors to attenuate observed relationships. So, if anything, our striving 
for  simplicity  should  weaken  the  empirical  evidence  rather  than 
strengthen it. 
3. Evidence from psychology and sociology 
The  findings  of  Easterlin  (1974)  have  been  confirmed  by  Duncan 
(1975).  In two samples of housewives in the Detroit area in  1955 and 
1971 respectively, respondents were asked to rate their own satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction with  their standard of living.  Although the median 
family income in the 1971 sample was 42% higher in real terms than in 
the  1955 sample,  the  distribution  of responses  was  not  significantly 
different  between  the  two  samples.  Regression  analysis  shows  that 
within  each sample the  satisfaction with  the  standard  of living  rises 
significantly with income. These findings are completely in  line  with 
those of Easterlin. 
The  basic  notions  underlying  the  PF  theory  are  more  common 
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(1966).  A  national  probability  sample  of  graduating  college  men  is 
analyzed  to  investigate  determinants  of  career  decisions  of  those 
graduates. It turns out that grade-point average is a far more important 
determinant of career plans than the selectivity of the college attended. 
Thus, for example, grade A  students at a prestigious college and a not 
very selective one have basically the same career plans even although 
A-students at the latter college would only score C's at the former one. 
This  indicates  that  students  mainly restrict  their  reference  group  to 
other  students  at  their  own  college,  more  or  less  disregarding  the 
ranking of their college nationally. 
Research by Bassis (1977) qualifies this outcome somewhat in that he 
finds that academic self-evaluations of college freshmen also take into 
account the selectivity of the college they attend, i.e., they extend their 
reference group to students outside their own college. However, GPA is 
still  more important  than college selectivity. Furthermore, one would 
expect the freshmen's reference weights to evolve over time, so that by 
the  time  of  graduation  they  may  have  reference  groups  mainly  re- 
stricted to other students at their own college. 
The examples quoted so far are cross sectional in nature. Evaluations 
appear  to  depend on  one's  ranking  in  a  perceived  distribution  in  a 
reference  group.  The  findings  discussed  can  be  grouped  under  the 
heading of "relative deprivation". This notion has  been developed by 
Stouffer et al. (1949), Merton and Kitt (1950), Davis (1959), Runciman 
(1966), among others. An individual's relative deprivation in a relevant 
dimension  depends  on  which  persons  he  compares  himself  to  and 
whether  these persons  score  higher or  lower  on  that  dimension. For 
instance, if career progress is  the dimension we are interested in,  the 
individual is relatively deprived if most persons he compares himself to 
(i.e.,  people in  his  reference group)  make  faster  promotions than  he 
does.  Relative  deprivation  is  a  measure  of  the  lack  of  well-being. 
Relative deprivation theory appears to be closely connected with the PF 
theory, given its emphasis on comparisons with others as a determinant 
of  well-being.  The  dynamic  component of  the  PF  theory  is  mainly 
lacking in the Relative Deprivation theory [2]. 
A  theory which takes into account both the cross sectional and the 
dynamic aspects of preference formation (or more generally the elicita- 
[2]  Runciman's  description  of  relative  deprivation  (1966:  10)  does  also  include  a  dynamic 
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tion  of judgments) is  the so-called  Adaptation  Level (AL)  theory.  A 
definition  of  the  AL  concept  is  given  by  Helson  as  follows:  " ... 
adaptation level is defined as a weighted geometric mean of all stimuli 
impinging upon  the  organism from without  and  all  stimuli affecting 
behaviour from within" (Helson 1964:  59). The weights in the geomet- 
ric mean are determined experimentally and vary per context. Among 
other things, the weights may depend on the amount of time elapsed 
since a stimulus was perceived. The AL serves as a frame of reference to 
judge new stimuli. 
An example of how AL theory is tested in psychological experiments 
is provided by Helson and Kozaki (1968) (described by Helson (1971)). 
Four groups of 5  subjects were shown random patterns of 10, 12,  14, 
16,  and  18  dots exposed for 0.30  seconds. Before that,  one group was 
shown a random pattern of 4 dots, the second group was shown 13 dots 
and the third group was shown 32 dots. The fourth group (the control 
group) was not shown anything in advance. During the experiment the 
subjects were asked to estimate the number of dots shown to them. It 
turns out that the first group gives the highest estimates and the third 
group  the  lowest,  with  the  remaining  two  groups  in  between.  The 
explanation  is  that  the  AL,  being  a  weighted  geometric  mean  of 
previous stimuli (in  this case presumably all random patterns of dots 
the  subjects  have  ever  seen  over  their  life-time)  is  different  for  the 
different groups,  because the most recent component of the AL  (the 
dots shown just before the experiment) is different. 
The weighted mean in equation (1)  can obviously be interpreted as 
an AL (strictly speaking, of course, AL requires a geometric mean, but 
that  does not  affect  the basic  point).  So  (1)  is  a  special  case  of AL 
theory. This clarifies the relation between AL theory and PF theory. On 
the one hand AL theory is more general, because it extends to all kinds 
of judgments, not just evaluation of income or consumption. It is also 
less  complete, however, in  that  only a  weighted average of stimuli is 
used  to  define the AL.  No  allowance is  made for  the  distribution  of 
previous stimuli, in the way the PF theory emerged as a refinement and 
generalization of (1). 
Relative  deprivation  theory  and  AL  theory  were  taken  here  as 
examples of sociological and psychological theories with a  bearing on 
preference formation. Obviously, other theories are related as well, like 
reference  group  theory  (e.g.,  Hyman  and  Singer  (1968)),  dissonance 
theory (e.g.  Festinger (1957)),  social comparison theory (e.g.  Festinger 146  A. Kapteyn, T.  Wansbeek /  Preference  formation 
(1954)),  anchoring  effects  (e.g.  Tversky  and  Kahneman  (1974)),  etc. 
Being economists,  we are not  able  to  exactly evaluate the differences 
and  agreements between these  theories.  A  superficial  glance  suggests 
that they reflect very similar mechanisms, which may not be understood 
completely yet, and of which the PF  theory is just  one representative. 
4. Evidence involving individual welfare functions 
For simplicity we will almost exclusively discuss evidence with respect 
to the evaluation of incomes, although also evidence has been obtained 
regarding  the  evaluation  of  expenditures  on  durables.  A  couple  of 
individual welfare functions are sketched in figs.  1 and 2.  An individ- 
ual's  WFI  measures  on  a  [0,1]-scale  the  satisfaction  the  individual 
would derive from any income level between zero and infinity. A  WFI 
is described by two parameters ~ and a, which generally differ between 
individuals (see, e.g. Van Praag and Kapteyn (1973)). The quantity e "" 
is the income which Individual n would evaluate by 0.5, on a [0,1]-scale. 
Thus  the  higher  e ~o  (or  /~.  for  that  matter)  is,  the  more  income 
Individual n  requires to  attain a  certain degree of satisfaction.  In this 
respect  /~n  is  a  measure  of  Individual  n's  wants.  The  parameter  o  n 
measures to which extent Individual n is sensitive to income changes or 
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income differences. If o  n is  small,  a  modest change of Individual n's 
income will have a pronounced effect on his evaluation of his income. 
If o  n is large, such a  change of income has only a  minor effect on the 
evaluation of his income. 
This is not the place to describe in detail how the parameters/~ and o 
are  measured  per  individual  (see,  e.g.,  Van  Praag  (1971),  Van 
Herwaarden and Kapteyn (1981)). Basically an individual is presented a 
number of verbal descriptions of satisfaction levels and asked to report 
which income level corresponds to each satisfaction level. This provides 
a number of points of the individual's WFI from which the parameters 
/~ and o of his WFI can be estimated by a  simple regression. 
Given the interpretation of/~n and on, a number of predictions can be 
derived from the PF theory and confronted with data: 
(1)  When asked to evaluate family income, individuals in larger fami- 
lies will tend to exhibit a larger/~, because a larger family requires a 
larger  family income to  have  the  same standardized income (and 
hence  the  same  ranking  in  the  perceived  standardized  income 
distribution) as a  smaller family. This finding is confirmed by Van 
Praag  (1971),  Van  Praag  and  Kapteyn  (1973),  Kapteyn  and  Van 
Praag (1976),  among others. Invoking the economic definition of a 
true cost of living index, the dependence of/~ on family size can be 
employed to construct family equivalence scales (Kapteyn and Van 
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(2)  Ceteris paribus, individuals with reference groups containing rela- 
tively large  families will have a  lower/~  than  others with  smaller 
families in their reference group. This is so, because the incidence of 
large families decreases the standardized incomes in the reference 
group, so one needs a  lower income to attain  a  ~ertain ranking at 
the perceived distribution of standardized incomes. Indeed, Van de 
Stadt and Kapteyn (1982)  find a  significantly negative effect on/z 
of the median family size in one's reference group. 
(3)  Individuals with a  larger income tend to have a  larger ~,  because 
one's own income is part of the presently perceived income distri- 
bution. This finding was confirmed in the studies mentioned under 
(1), but also in van Herwaarden et al. (1977). 
(4)  The higher the incomes in one's reference group, the higher one's 
will be. This is confirmed by Kapteyn et al. (1976,  1978). 
(5)  From  a  somewhat  technical  argument  it  can  be  seen  that  the 
correlation between/~  and  income, referred  to  under (3),  will  be 
strongest for people whose incomes don't change much over time. 
This is confirmed by Kapteyn (1977),  and Van Herwaarden et  al. 
(1977). 
(6)  An individual's o will tend to be large if the dispersion of incomes 
in  his  reference  group  is  relatively  high.  This  is  confirmed  by 
Kapteyn et al. (1976,  1978).  As slightly more indirect evidence, Van 
Praag et al. (1977,  1980)  find in a cross-country comparison within 
the  European  Community  that,  on  average,  individuals  have  a 
significantly larger o  in  countries with an unequal distribution of 
incomes. 
(7)  An individual's o  will tend to be large if his income has  changed 
considerably  over  time.  This  was  found  to  be  true  by  Kapteyn 
(1977), and Van Herwaarden et al. (1977). 
These various  effects  can  be  integrated in  one  quantitative model 
describing the influence of past and present incomes on individual ~'s 
and o 's.  Estimating such a  model involves the estimation of reference 
weights and memory weights. The paper by Kapteyn et al.  (1980)  has 
gone farthest in  this  respect.  Their results  include an  estimate of the 
memory weights  indicating  that  for  any  practical  purpose  it  is  the 
events of the last  seven years  that determine an individual's frame of 
reference. These results have been replicated, by and large, by Van de 
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weights  indicates  a  memory of  more  than  seven  years.  Both  studies 
indicate that about 84% of the variance in t~ can be explained by the PF 
theory.  The  two  papers  did  not  employ  the  PF  theory  to  explain 
variation in o over individuals, so it is not known yet which percentage 
of its variance can be explained by the PF theory. 
Given the availability of a  quantitative model explaining an individ- 
ual's/~ and o, one can also investigate how individual satisfaction with 
income can be manipulated by changing the income distribution (e.g., 
by  introducing  a  family  allowance  system)  or  the  growth  rate  of 
incomes.  Such  exercises  are  of  obvious  relevance  to  socio-economic 
policy and will be briefly considered in the next section. 
5. A  few exercises 
The  exercises sketched here come from Kapteyn (1977)  and  Kapteyn 
and Van Herwaarden (1980).  We do not aim at a  derivation of results, 
but rather want to state some outcomes and give an intuitive explana- 
tion. The most simple exercise is the following one. Imagine a  society, 
consisting only of single person households in which everyone has had 
the same income for a  long time. That income has been growing at  a 
constant rate y, for the same long time. Except for personal differences, 
everyone evaluates  his  income by  the  same  number.  How  does  this 
number depend on the growth rate y? 
The answer is:  Not at  all!  This result appears  counter-intuitive and 
would have been hard to predict on the basis of qualitative considera- 
tions alone. Once the result has been obtained, an intuitive explanation 
is  of course possible:  Remember from the previous section that  small 
changes in income will lead to a  small o. If ~ is small, a  small increase 
in income each year still has a  sizeable positive effect on the evaluation 
of that income (cf. fig. 2).  On the other hand, a  high growth rate leads 
to a  large o. Consequently, the relatively large increase in income from 
year  to  year has  only  a  modest  upward  effect on  the  evaluation  of 
income.  Thus,  there  are  two  situations:  With  a  low  growth rate,  the 
small o amplifies the positive welfare effects of the modest increases in 
income.  With  a  high  growth  rate,  the  large  ~  dampens  the  positive 
welfare effects of the sizeable increases in income. As a  result the two 
situations yield the same level of satisfaction of income. 
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least to a situation that has not materialized yet. That does not make it 
irrelevant.  It  is  in  the  nature  of policy  to  aim  at  the  realization  of 
situations that do not yet exist. The exercise illustrates that in  such a 
case intuition may be insufficient to predict what the result of a policy 
will be. Only a quantitative thoroughly tested model can be of guidance 
in such situations. That is not to say that the PF theory is such a model. 
Substantially more work has to be done to  assess its  empirical status. 
The beauty of the example considered is its independence of parame- 
ter  values.  In  more  general  cases  in  which  incomes  differ  between 
individuals, families are of different size and growth rates of incomes 
are possibly different, the effect of a  particular income policy on any 
individual's satisfaction with income depends on the memory weights, 
reference weights, family size, etc. So then these parameters have to be 
known with sufficient accuracy to attain specific policy goals. 
As an example, Kapteyn and Van Herwaarden (1980)  use reference 
weights estimated by  Kapteyn et  al.  (1976,  1978) to  calculate which 
income  distribution  in  The  Netherlands  would  have  maximized  an 
additive social welfare function, which has WFI's as its argument. This 
analysis  ignores  dynamic effects  as  well  as  any  feedback  from  the 
income distribution to work effort and should therefore be interpreted 
with caution. But the results serve to illustrate how the PF theory alters 
policy conclusions, or, equivalently, how a neglect of preference forma- 
tion aspects may lead to policies that do not achieve their goals. 
The first example given also illustrates how a  more specific theory 
yields extra insights. If one only takes into account the adaptation of/~ 
(which  is  done  in  AL  theory),  then  it  would  seem  that  the  faster 
economic growth is,  the higher individual welfare. This brings out the 
prospect of a Hedonic treadmill (Brickman and Campbell (1971)).  We 
need  economic growth  forever to  keep  people  happy.  The  example 
illustrates that at least the treadmill doesn't have to go very fast. One 
may furthermore introduce the  possibility  of upward  sloping  age in- 
come  profiles  for  every  individual  without  an  increase  of  average 
income in society. In that case everyone would experience a growth in 
income which,  according to  the  PF  theory, increases the  satisfaction 
with one's income. 
As a result a steady state appears to be attainable where people are 
reasonably happy. Given constraints stemming from the limited availa- 
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6. What has all this to do with economics? 
With  relatively  few  exceptions,  economists  have  ignored  preference 
formation. In quite a few areas, theories are heavily dependent on the 
assumption that preferences are constant and/or independent of behav- 
ior of others. Allowing for preference formation has  some significant 
consequences. 
In welfare economics, the  Pareto principle (or its  sister  the Kaldor 
compensation principle) looses its practical appeal if it can no longer be 
assumed that an income increase for some, without an income reduc- 
tion  for  anyone  else,  provides  an  increase  in  social  welfare.  In  cost 
benefit analysis distributional aspects move from the periphery of the 
problem to the core. Results in optimal taxation change likewise. For 
example, in a  simple model where individual utility depends on one's 
relative position  in  the income distribution  and  on  number of hours 
worked, Layard (1980) derives the optimal marginal tax rate to be unity 
[3]! Earlier,  Feldstein (1976:  81)  suggested that results in the optimal 
taxation  literature,  which  imply  "surprisingly  little  redistribution 
through the tax-transfer process" may be due to the neglect of external 
effects of consumption (in particular altruism or envy). 
If the casual observer (that is everyone who is not an economist) is 
right  in  asserting  that  an  individual's  consumption  behavior  is  in- 
fluenced by the  consumption of others,  then  all  economic models  of 
consumption are misspecified. It goes without saying that this does not 
help the quality of econometric forecasts. Similarly, one would expect 
behavior  on  the  labor  market  to  be  influenced by  the  behavior  of 
others,  which also  suggests improvements in models  of labor  supply, 
etc. 
7. Concluding remarks 
The  evidence on  preference formation  sketched  in  this  paper  is  un- 
ambiguous. It uniformly supports the PF theory explained in section 2. 
Still, more testing is possible and should be carried out, but at the very 
[3]  One of the referees observes that ".~.  any model which derives an optimal marginal tax rate of 
unity must be wrong!" This may be true,  of course, but  Layard's analysis shows how sensitive 
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least the existence of the preference formation phenomenon appears to 
be firmly established. Consequently, economic theories that are based 
on  the  assumption of constant preferences  should be  considered un- 
acceptable [4]. 
Admittedly, allowing for preference formation does not make eco- 
nomic modelling any easier. Economic models are already complicated, 
because  economists  tend  to  despise  the  possibility  of  direct  utility 
measurement.  Utility  is  measured  indirectly  through  models  which 
relate  behavior  to  utility  functions.  If  we  allow  for  shifting  utility 
functions, the shifts have to be incorporated in the behavioral model. 
In the words of Duesenberry (1949:17): 
Ordinarily we try to measure preference parameters (or functions of them) by market behavior, 
since we cannot observe the preferences directly. With shifting parameters we should be carrying 
indirect  measurement  a  step farther.  We  would  not  only  have  to  measure  the  preference 
parameters but the parameters of the relation governing shifts in the preferences. 
The use of direct measures of utility, like WFI's, makes life simpler 
again,  because  now  the preference formation process  can  be  studied 
independently from a behavioral model, which would relate behavior to 
preferences. In addition, the data requirements will tend to be substan- 
tially less,  because utility measures like WFI's can be  measured rela- 
tively  easy,  whereas  models  of  consumption,  for  instance,  require 
records of consumption over an extended period of time. Likewise, in 
applied welfare economics, the existence of preference formation makes 
it  almost  impossible  to  use  traditional  indicators  of  well-being  like 
income, because income no longer bears  a  simple monotonic relation 
with well-being. Directly measured individual utility indicators remain 
as the obvious alternative. 
Finally, let us return to the first theme mentioned at the beginning of 
the paper. It is clear that the main ideas embodied in the PF theory can 
be found at many places in the psychology and sociology literature. The 
[4]  Again,  as  observed by  a  referee,  although  overall  happiness may  increase or  decrease,  an 
individual's ordering of alternative consumption bundles may remain unchanged. Since a large part 
of this evidence discussed deals with well-being and happiness, this would not imply that demand 
functions are subject to preference formation. Some of the evidence, like that concerning career 
choice, does deal with multidimensional choices, however, and also the preference formation plays 
its part.  More generally, the evidence discussed in section 4  concerns a  theory which is derived 
from a theory dealing with consumption bundles. The latter theory does imply that the ordering of 
consumption bundles will  change under  the influence of consumption by  others  or  under  the 
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thing  that  sets  the  PF  theory  aside  is its  exactness.  This  increases  the 
number of tests that can be performed. In addition,  the theory leads to 
quantitative  predictions,  which  are  more  informative,  both  from  a 
scientific and a policy view point. 
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